described the Soviet Note to Poland in cautions words as being the 4S mile- stone in Russian foreign policy—a foreign policy which is going to be very^ very important to the world around the post-war conference table." No one at that time wanted to recognise that Russia intended to achieve her first goal before the victorious Powers sat around such a table. The attempts of London and Washington to prevent this break in the Alliance had been in vain. It was simply the commencement of an attack under- taken by Russian diplomacy against the Allies, and Poland was but the first geographical objective.* Once more she found herself in a similar position to the one she had held in 1939 during the Anglo-Franco-Germaa clash. Once again, until the attacking Power concentrated the fury of its attack against Poland and overcame that country., it would be unable to advance further to the nest line and storm it. A preparatory move in this direction was made shortly afterwards by the Soviets^ when on July 29^ I9433 the establishment of the c Committee of Free Germans * was announced in Moscow* There was an amazing similarity between the tactics of the leaders of the Soviet Union during the Second Great War and the Tsarist diplomacy of the First Great War. This similarity extended away back into the centuries of conquest made by some of the most prominent representatives of Tsardom. One of the methods moSt frequently employed was to level accusations against the leaders of a neighbouring country which, in the opinion of Moscow, was ripe for annexation. In the event of its leaders entirely and unreservedly refusing to submit to Russia, then usurpers to whom Tsardom gave every assistance were brought forward, men who it was professed indicated the c genuine will9 of the nation which was being attacked and under whose name Muscovy could and did impose its wishes. By the Muscovite law, no leading element in a newly conquered country was allowed to remain alive, If there was no resistance, then Tsardom, in order to justify its actions, invariably imposed terms which were im- possible to fulfil or meant suicide for the leaders and the people.f In April,i943> the Soviet Note to the Polish Government was accom- panied by two such demands, namely, to give up any * claim * to Eastern Poland and to change some of the most hated and e guilty' members of the Polish Government, among them the Minister of National Defence, * The German News Agency Tramocean not altogether inaccurately observed (April 29th, 1943);—it was hardly imaginable that Soviet Russia was attaching any decisive importance to the attitude of the Polish emigre government towards the frontier question and, therefore, the opinion prevailed that Moscow's attitude, in the long run, was directed against England and the United States and repre- sented another accentuation of Soviet mistrust of the Allied Powers. t Giles Fletcher related how the Tsar had demanded several cart-loads of cedars from the city of Tver3 although no cedars grew in that area, and from another small town a cup of fleas. As neither towns were able to satisfy these demands, the sought-for opportunity to punish them was created. m.